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I. INTRODUCTION 
Penny auctions, an online phenomenon imported from Europe, op-
erate by the hundreds in the United States without meaningful oversight 
from consumer protection agencies.1 In a penny auction, consumers 
compete for items one penny at a time.2 Consumer complaints about 
penny auctions—“a combination of bingo night, the Home Shopping 
Network and a slot machine addiction”3—may inspire a comprehensive 
regulatory response. But, potential regulation will respond too slowly 
and unevenly to address the consumer’s present concerns. A current so-
lution is needed to address the business model that the Better Business 
Bureau identified as the top “Sales Scam” of 2011.4 As of November 
2012, just three state Attorneys General5 and the Federal Trade Commis-
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 1. With Penny Auctions, You Can Spend a Bundle but Still Leave Empty-Handed, 
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG (Mar. 2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2011/12/with-penny-
auctions-you-can-spend-a-bundle-but-still-leave-empty-handed/index.htm (“The penny-auction 
world feels a bit like the Wild West.”). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Shelley Dubois, Penny Auction Bet on Chump Change, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.wired.com/business/2010/01/penny-auctions-bet-on-chump-change-part-i-of-ii/. 
 4. BBB Names Top Ten Scams of 2011, BETTER BUS. BUREAU (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://www.bbb.org/us/article/bbb-names-top-ten-scams-of-2011-31711. “BBB recommends you 
treat [penny auctions] the same way you would legal gambling in a casino—know exactly how the 
bidding works, set a limit for yourself, and be prepared to walk away before you go over that limit.” 
Id. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the meltdown of the housing market, consumer scams 
of all sorts are not in short supply. See, e.g., Zachary E. Davies, Comment, Rescuing the Rescued: 
Stemming the Tide of Foreclosure Rescue Scams in Washington, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353, 360 
(2008) (“The CPA . . . prohibits unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent business practices . . . but it offers an 
inadequate remedy because of a low damages cap. . . . [I]ts $10,000 cap on exemplary damages has 
not been raised since being established in 1971. . . . A plaintiff bringing a claim under the CPA must 
establish five elements: (1) the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) the act 
or practice occurred in trade or commerce; (3) the act or practice impacts the public interest; (4) the 
plaintiff suffered injury; and (5) the act or practice caused the injury.”). 
 5. See Active Public Consumer-Related Investigation, Case Num. L12–3–1029, FLA. OFFICE 
ATT’Y GEN., http://www.myfloridalegal.com/lit_ec.nsf/investigations/4816DFB0311DD21985 
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sion6 investigated the operation of an online penny auction.7 This handful 
of investigations into penny auctions did not challenge the legitimacy of 
the business model.8 Instead, these investigations focused on misleading 
advertising or discrete instances of deceptive practices.9 More recently, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against Rex 
Venture Group, LLC for an alleged Ponzi and pyramid scheme through 
its website ZeekRewards.com, an “affiliated advertising division” of 
Zeekler.com, a penny auction.10 To date, no significant inquiry, either 
academic or practical, into the legitimacy of the penny auction has oc-
curred.11 
                                                                                                             
2579D5004AE52C (last visited Aug. 17, 2012) (investigating Ecom Interactive, LLC d/b/a 
zbiddy.com for Potential 501.204, Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices); Press Release, Wash. 
State Office of the Attorney Gen., PennyBiddr Agrees to Cash Out and Refund Consumers Under 
Agreement with Washington Attorney General (Sep. 28, 2010), available at 
http://atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?&id=26506 (describing consent decree resolving investigation of 
Federal Way-based penny auction website); Press Release, Ga. Governor’s Office of Consumer 
Prot., Wavee.com Settles with the Governor’s Office of Consumer Protection (July 6, 2011), availa-
ble at http://consumer.georgia.gov/news/press-releases/view/wavee-com-settles-with-the-governor-
soffice-of-consumer-protection (announcing settlement with Georgia-based penny auction website to 
cease operations, provide $202,210.20 in consumer restitution, and pay a $35,000 civil penalty and 
$15,000 in administrative expenses); see also Herb Weisbaum, Most Online Penny Auctions Just 
Don’t Make Any Sense, MSNBC.COM, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44010040/ns/business-
consumer_news/t/most-online-penny-auctions-just-dont-make-any-sense/#.UE_Tg7KPXMA (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2012) (discussing penny auction websites generally and all three investigations by 
state attorneys general). 
 6. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Online Marketers with Scamming Con-
sumers out of Hundreds of Millions of Dollars with ‘Free’ Trial Offers (May 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/05/jessewillms.shtm. 
 7. Private action in the form of complaints and lawsuits is also on the rise. An Oregon consum-
er filed a class-action suit in federal court against one of the largest auction websites, Quibids.com, 
alleging that the website is engaging in gambling. John McCarthy, Penny Auctions Promise Savings, 
Overlook Downside, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2011), available at http://www.usato 
day.com/tech/news/2011-02-06-penny-auctions_N.htm. 
 8. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 9. See supra notes 3–4. To its credit, the Consumer Protection Division of the Washington 
State Attorney General’s Office conducted an investigation into a Washington-based website using a 
shill bidding program. Washington State Office of the Attorney General, supra note 5. 
 10. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Shuts Down $600 Million Online Pyramid and 
Ponzi Scheme (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-160.htm; see 
also James O’Toole, SEC Shuts Down Alleged $600 Million Ponzi Scheme, CNN MONEY (Aug. 17, 
2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/17/technology/zeek-rewards-ponzi-scheme/index.html; see 
also Complaint, SEC v. Rex Venture Group, 2012 WL 3550930 (W.D.N.C.). 
 11. The uncertainty of the legal status of penny auctions under federal and state law is com-
pounded by the lack of consensus on the effectiveness and viability of the Unlawful Internet Gam-
bling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5361-5367, and other law seeking to control or prohibit online 
gambling. See, e.g., David B. Kuznick, Betting Blind: Problems with Proposed Federal Regulation 
of Online Poker, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 450 (2012) (proposing improvements to the current body of 
regulatory law); Rachel J. Schaefer, Note, Must the House Always Win?: A Critique of Rousso v. 
State, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1549 (2012) (critiquing Washington state’s current approach to online 
gambling). 
2013] Online Penny Auctions  1969 
Although marketed as auctions, online penny auctions may actually 
qualify as lotteries. Unlike the multifarious and confusing definitions of 
gambling,12 the long-accepted definition13 of a lottery consists of three 
elements: prize, consideration, and chance.14 If a penny auction satisfies 
this definition then, under well-established case law in Washington, it is 
prohibited under the mandatory and self-executing lottery clause,15 as 
well as a probable violation of the Washington Consumer Protection 
Act.16 
This Comment will explore whether an online penny auction con-
stitutes a lottery under article II, §24 of the Washington constitution. Ul-
timately, this Comment concludes that penny auctions are lotteries and 
should be regulated as such to protect consumers while improving Wash-
ington’s own bottom line. Part II explains the typical operation of an 
online penny auction with the help of two hypothetical auctions. Part III 
reviews lottery law in Washington and discusses the constitutional basis 
of the lottery prohibition, as well as its intersection with consumer pro-
tection. Part IV explores the elements of the definition of a lottery, focus-
ing on the most difficult element—chance. Part V discusses Washing-
ton’s potential judicial, statutory, and regulatory responses to the grow-
ing penny auction industry. This Comment contends that instead of ban-
ning penny auctions outright, the state could adopt the penny auction 
model as an expansion of the traditional state-run lottery games into the 
online environment. Part VI briefly concludes. 
II. WHAT IS A PENNY AUCTION? 
The typical penny auction website17 has several pages of auction 
items, including electronics, computers, jewelry, and other merchan-
dise.18 The website lists the items with extremely low prices and banners 
                                                 
 12. Gambling statutes and regulation are notoriously complex. Particularly troublesome is 
establishing the “nexus” in order for a bid fee to constitute a bet under gaming law. See, e.g.,WASH. 
REV. CODE § 19.46. The definition of lottery law, distinct from the complex regulation of gambling 
and other games of chance, is much more straightforward. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See cases cited infra note 80. 
 14. See cases cited infra note 83. 
 15. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 24. 
 16. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.010. 
 17. The description here is a generalization and is not intended as a portrayal of any individual 
website. There are hundreds of penny auction websites with a variety of designs. One unverified 
estimate places the number at over 1,100 websites, though slightly more than half are currently inac-
tive. Complete Penny Auction Site Listing, ALLPENNYAUCTIONS.COM, http://www.allpennyauc 
tions.com/complete_penny_auction_site_list/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2012). A few of the largest penny 
auction websites include Quibids (www.quibids.com), BidRivals (www.bidrivals.com), SkoreIt! 
(www.skoreit.com), and Beezid (www.beezid.com). 
 18. Online Penny Auctions: Nothing for Something?, Consumer Information, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (Aug. 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt041.shtm. 
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with flash savings of up to 90% or more.19 The items on the homepage 
“appear to be selling extremely fast and mind-bogglingly cheaply: a $100 
gift card for 16¢; a $150 knife set for $1.82; a $1,700 HD TV for 
$32.19.”20 Not surprisingly, most bidders, even those that win an auction, 
do not experience the dramatic advertised savings.21 In the current econ-
omy, when the need to budget is greater than ever, penny auctions pro-
vide an incredible temptation precisely because of their unbelievable 
selling prices.22 
Each auction starts at a very low price varying from $0.00 to $0.50, 
with no expressly established reserve price.23 Each bid during a penny 
auction increases the price by $0.01.24 In addition to a picture of the mer-
chandise and the current bid amount, every auction has a countdown tim-
er.25 The “winner” is the person who placed the last, and therefore high-
est, bid when the timer runs out.26 But with every bid the timer increases 
a set amount, anywhere from ten seconds to two minutes.27 
Unlike other auction websites, penny auction websites charge bid-
ders a small fee, usually between $0.50 and $1.00, for each bid.28 Bidders 
buy bids in variously sized “bid packages” up front.29 Packages range 
from as few as 10 bids to 500 or more.30 For all bidders, the bid fees are 
paid to the penny auction website whether or not the bid is used in an 
auction.31 
To better understand the progression of a penny auction, consider 
this hypothetical in which you are a new bidder on a penny auction web-
site. You came to the website after clicking on a flashy banner ad that 
                                                 
 19. Susan Stellin, Penny Auction Scam, REAL SIMPLE, http://www.realsimple.com/work-
life/money/penny-auction-scam-00100000067690/index.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2012). 
 20. Jennifer Eagan, Losing Your Cents, TIME MAG., Jun. 17, 2010, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1997462,00.html#ixzz1fBAmqFaq. 
 21. One BidRodeo winner used a total of 451 bids at a cost of $306 to claim a 16-gigabyte 
iPad—a savings of roughly 35%, or $172, off the retail price. Deborah L. Cohen, Entrepreneur 
Turns Pennies into Million-Dollar Business, REUTERS (Jun. 9, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/09/us-column-cohen-bidrodeo-idUSTRE65848P20100609. 
 22. “For anybody who finds a bargain even mildly stimulating, this is like pure heroin. In re-
cessionary times, it’s like heroin that will also save puppies.” Eagan, supra note 20. 
 23. Online Penny Auctions: Nothing for Something?, supra note 18. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. FED. TRADE COMM’N, AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF ONLINE PENNY AUCTIONS (2011), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/articles/naps46.pdf. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Amanda Lee, From A to BeeZid: A Beginner’s Guide to Winning Penny Auctions, PENNY 
AUCTION WATCH (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.pennyauctionwatch.com/2011/04/from-a-to-beezid-
penny-auction-tips-beginners/. 
 31. Id. 
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accompanied your search results. On the homepage, you find a 
smartphone “listed” at a start price of $0.50.32 The low starting price en-
tices you, a new visitor to the world of penny auctions, to give it a shot.33 
“After all it’s 50 cents plus a penny—what a deal!”34 You buy a “special 
offer” package of 250 bids and enter a promo code for 10 free bids you 
remembered from the radio this morning.35 You start bidding early be-
cause of the excitement of the timer, the hunt for a bargain, and the fact 
that only a few bidders appear interested. For the sake of simplicity,36 we 
will limit the auction to you and one other person.37 
The price slowly increases from $0.50 to $1.00, still a bargain, as 
you and your opponent trade $0.01 bids. Transfixed by the excitement of 
your battle with an anonymous opponent, you keep clicking the “Bid” 
button. Finally, after what seems like hours of back and forth, your op-
ponent fails to bid and the timer mercifully reaches zero. You win! And 
the final bid price for your new smartphone—just $5.00. 
But to get from the start price, there were 450 bids.38 And half of 
those bids were yours at $0.60 per bid.39 Your one-time steal of a deal 
dissolved into $135 in bid fees, plus the $5.00 final bid price (to say 
nothing of taxes and shipping and handling).40 Meanwhile, your competi-
tor walks away without a smartphone and without his $135.41 
                                                 
 32. Tony Duke, Penny Auctions May Leave You Feeling Pound Foolish, N. ISLAND MIDWEEK 
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.northislandmidweek.com/news/133917968.html. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Advertisements for online penny auctions are not terribly common, but the industry has 
advertised on a variety of platforms, including radio and television. Penny Auction Commercials – 
QuiBids and Beezid, BID PENNY (Mar. 20, 2011), http://bidpenny.blogspot.com/2011/03/penny-
auction-commercials.html (criticizing the production value of most penny auction commercials). 
This Comment does not consider whether the mediums themselves, some of which adopt guidelines 
for endorsements or at least respond to public pressure, owe any duty to consumers regarding penny 
auction advertising. E.g., Timothy Burke, ESPN Personalities Shill for Penny-Auction Site, Despite 
the Worldwide Leader’s “Endorsement Guidelines,” DEADSPIN (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://deadspin.com/5868734/espn-personalities-shill-for-penny+auction-site-despite-the-worldwide-
leaders-endorsement-guidelines (questioning the wisdom of ESPN personalities’ endorsements of 
SkoreIt.com when “googling ‘skoreit scam’ returns about 21,000 results, most of them from sites 
like RipoffReport, ComplaintsBoard, ScamBook, and FindTheScam”). 
 36. This simplification helps illustrate the amount the losing bidder stands to forfeit. Nearly all 
penny auctions have more than two bidders. In fact, penny auctions for valuable merchandise can 
attract hundreds of unique bidders resulting in thousands of bids. Hall of Fame – Epic Battles, 
ALLPENNYAUCTIONS.COM, http://www.allpennyauctions.com/epic_battles/ (last visited Aug. 17, 
2012). 
 37. Duke, supra note 32. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Some penny auction sites allow expended bid fees to go towards a “Buy Now” feature. 
Under this feature, the bid fees are applied to the posted retail price of the item. Penny auction sites 
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Unlike a traditional in-person auction, a penny auction website gen-
erates most of its revenues from the bid fees you and your competitor 
expended, not from the winning bid price.42 Another hypothetical illumi-
nates how penny auction websites make a profit. In this hypothetical auc-
tion for another smartphone, bidders place a total of 999 bids, for a $10 
winning bid price. At $0.50 per bid, the penny auction website collected 
$499.50 plus the winning bid price, for a total revenue of $509.50. Los-
ing bidders do not get their bid fees back. As a result, the penny auction 
website easily covered the retail price of the smartphone, while the win-
ning bidder received a drastic discount. The bids placed by the losing 
bidders funded the winning bidder’s discount and the penny auction 
website’s profits.43 The openly redistributive nature of a penny auction 
mirrors the effect of a lottery.44 
Penny auctions also differ substantially from other online auctions. 
A comparison to eBay, the most well-known online auction website, il-
lustrates these differences. First, actual individuals, not eBay, list the 
auction items, whereas penny auction sites are responsible for listing 
items for auction.45 As a result, eBay has a significantly reduced incen-
tive to prolong auctions or encourage additional bidders through ques-
tionable tactics like “bidbots.”46 Second, an individual can choose a max-
imum bid amount, which eBay applies incrementally to the next highest 
bid; eBay users do not have to enter penny bids over and over again.47 
Third, eBay’s revenue stream is not predicated on bid fees because eBay 
does not charge an individual for placing a bid in an auction.48 Finally 
                                                                                                             
aver that this ability means you do not “lose” the money spent on bid fees. For a discussion on the 
impact of this feature under the element of consideration see infra Part III. 
 42. See Cohen, supra note 21. 
 43. See Kristin Alexander, Some Penny Auctions Use Cheap Tricks to Cheat Consumers, 
WASH. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. ALL CONSUMING BLOG (Sep. 28, 2010), http://www.atg. 
wa.gov/BlogPost.aspx?id=26514. 
 44. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILLIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES IN 
AMERICA 134 (1989) (“Some of the lottery’s effects are baldly redistributional: many lose so that a 
few might win.”). The redistributive effect is even more questionable because of the noted propensi-
ty of the economically disadvantaged to frequently purchase lottery tickets. See infra notes 147–48 
and accompanying text. 
 45. How Do I Buy an Item?, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/questions/buy-item.html 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2012). 
 46. “Bidbots” are computer programs that simulate real bidders in order to increase the bid 
price and prolong the auction. See infra Part IV. Penny auction websites use bidbots to increase the 
perceived traffic and the final bid price; individuals can also purchase bidbots for personal use to 
automatically place bids on their behalf. See infra notes 187–191 and accompanying text. 
 47. All About Bidding, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/aboutbidding.html (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2012). 
 48. See Fees for Selling on eBay, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2012); see also Aron Hsiao, What Does It Cost to Trade on eBay? Is There a Catch?, 
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and most significantly, only the winning bidder in an eBay auction pays 
any money.49 The losing bidders spend nothing. 
The secondary effects of the penny auction boom have materialized 
only recently. The penny auction industry has inspired a cottage industry 
of strategists claiming to possess knowledge for beating the system. Var-
ious sources—mostly online—provide “strategies” for winning penny 
auctions.50 One popular tip recommends developing a reputation as a 
“power bidder” by immediately outbidding any competition.51 This pow-
er bidder strategy bills itself as a psychological ploy to frustrate and in-
timidate the competition into capitulation.52 Another strategy recom-
mends refraining from bidding until the end of an auction to score a last 
minute victory when other bidders appear exhausted.53 By using one of 
these strategies, the bidder theoretically increases the likelihood of win-
ning in the short-term as other bidders may become discouraged by being 
quickly outbid, have used a large number of bids early, or failed to obtain 
a sufficient number of bids. In the long-term, according to most strategy 
guides, a history of victories can establish one’s reputation, which is 
available to other bidders on some websites, to dampen competition.54 
But really, only the creativity of the author limits the number of strate-
gies and the justifications of these strategies.55 A few sources even claim 
                                                                                                             
ABOUT.COM, http://ebay.about.com/od/frequentlyaskedquestion1/f/faq_whatcost.htm (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2012). 
 49. See All About Bidding, supra note 47. 
 50. How to Win a Penny Auction, EHOW.COM, http://www.ehow.com/how_5736070_win-
penny-auction-tips.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2012); Are Penny Auction Sites the Wave of the Fu-
ture?, PENNY AUCTIONS REV. (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.pennyauctionsreview.org; 5 Command-
ments to Winning, QUIBIDS, http://www.quibids.com/quibids101/blog/20-5-Commandments-to-
Winning (last visited Aug. 17, 2012); Penny Auction Strategy, PENNY AUCTION INTELLIGENCE, 
http://www.pennyauctionintelligence.com/penny-auction-strategy, (last visited Aug. 17, 2012). 
These tips are similar to other “get rich quick” schemes seen in any number of books on various 
topics. As the Better Business Bureau notes, “Sales scams are as old as humanity.” BBB Names Top 
Ten Scams of 2011, supra note 4. Significantly, some sites provide “tips” on winning on the penny 
auction’s own website. E.g., Tips and Strategies, BEEZID.COM, http://www.beezid.com/ 
help/bidding/tips-strategies (last visited Aug. 17, 2012). Naturally, this begs the question whether 
this is sound advice at all. See infra Part IV.C. 
 51. Winning Penny Auction Bidding Styles, BESTPENNYAUCTIONS.NET, 
http://www.bestpennyauctions.net/strategy/bidding-styles/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2012). 
 52. Id. 
 53. This type of strategy is often called “Sniper Bidding.” Id. 
 54. These tips and strategies are more critically examined in Part IV infra. 
 55. Other styles include “Blitzkreig,” “War of Attrition,” and “First In Bidder.” Id. Other strat-
egies emphasize studying the “trends and patterns” to discover the weaknesses of opponents. Penny 
Auction Strategy, PENNY AUCTION STRATEGY GUIDE, http://www.pennyauctionstrategyguide.com 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
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to rely on game theory and economics.56 And not surprisingly, some of 
these “secrets” are not free.57 
With this background into the operation of a penny auction, Part III 
briefly surveys the current Washington lottery law and its intersection 
with the Washington Consumer Protection Act. While this Comment 
applies Washington law for the sake of clarity, Washington’s prohibition 
against lotteries is nothing unusual.58 
III. LOTTERY LAW IN WASHINGTON 
Washington’s constitutional prohibition on lotteries is as old as the 
state itself. By the time Washington became a state, the tide had turned 
against lotteries in most of the United States.59 According to Washington 
law, lotteries “shall be prohibited except as specifically authorized upon 
the affirmative vote of sixty percent of the members of each house of the 
legislature or . . . by referendum or initiative approved by a sixty percent 
affirmative vote of the electors thereon.”60 This clause is mandatory and 
self-executing.61 
                                                 
 56. Amanda Lee, Is There an Effective Strategy to Winning Penny Auctions?, PENNY AUCTION 
WATCH (Sep. 1, 2009), http://www.pennyauctionwatch.com/2009/09/penny-auction-strategy/ (quot-
ing blog post discussing the implications of game theory and the work of Dr. John Nash to explain 
Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift game theory applied to penny auctions). 
 57. “The Penny Auction Secret – Ultimate Bidder Manuscript” costs $17. Attention! Before 
You Purchase Any Bids From a Penny Auction, You Need to Know There’s an Easier Way to Win, 
PENNY AUCTION SECRET, http://www.pennyauctionsecret.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
 58. Although the prohibitions of lotteries and sales of lottery tickets are more often by statute, 
many states have constitutional provisions. 54 C.J.S. Lotteries § 10 (2012). Some state constitutions 
even have stronger prohibitory language than Washington. E.g., KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 3 (“Lotter-
ies and the sale of lottery tickets are forever prohibited.”). Other state constitutions merely direct the 
state legislature to pass laws to prohibit lotteries. E.g., W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 36 (“The legislature 
shall have no power to authorize lotteries or gift enterprises for any purpose, and shall pass laws to 
prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets in this State.”). Lottery law, like gambling law 
generally, underwent a series of ups and downs in the United States, but every state regulates lotter-
ies to some extent. See generally GEORGE SULLIVAN, BY CHANCE A WINNER: THE HISTORY OF 
LOTTERIES 40–51 (Dodd, Mead, 1972). Current laws are actually markedly more lenient than the 
early 20th century. See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law-Update 1993, 15 HASTINGS COMM. 
& ENT. L.J. 93, 96 (1992) (“[T]he great Louisiana Lottery scandal of the 1890s led to the passage of 
strong federal anti-lottery laws and a complete prohibition of state lotteries for seventy years, until 
they were reintroduced by New Hampshire in 1963.”). State and federal authorities demonstrate no 
inclination to reverse this liberalization; in fact, further relaxation may be the order of the day. See 
Rose, infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 59. “In fact, the problems lotteries created were of such a magnitude and were so pervasive that 
by the late 1800s the States were nearly unanimous in imposing constitutional prohibitions on lotter-
ies.” Opinion of the Justices, 795 So. 2d 630, 634 (Ala. 2001). 
 60. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 24. 
 61. City of Seattle v. Chin Let, 52 P. 324, 325 (Wash. 1898) (“The language of the constitution 
is mandatory, and the provision is self-executing.”). 
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As a self-executing provision, “the legislature cannot, by loose, 
vague or inapt definition of lottery, constitutionally authorize indirectly 
in law what the courts reasonably find to be a lottery in fact.”62 The judi-
cial inquiry “must look into, through and around any schemes and devic-
es which appear even superficially to constitute a lottery.”63 Thus, the 
constitutional ban applies to any scheme the court concludes is a lottery, 
regardless of the common understanding of what constitutes a lottery or 
the purveyors attempt to relabel a scheme to avoid the ban.64 
The broad and sweeping terms of the provision are intentional.65 
This phrasing is “all embracing as far as different types and kinds of lot-
tery schemes and devices are concerned.”66 Framers of the Washington 
constitution intended to ban all lotteries, not a specific methodology or 
design.67 Nor is the wide breadth of the definition of a lottery unique to 
Washington.68 But the broad prohibition does not “forbid games of skill 
or . . . bar the ordinary chance or contingency which is involved in prac-
tically every human endeavor,”69 which would have been as impossible 
as it would be unpopular. 
Washington laws preclude the lottery promoter’s gains so the pro-
moter cannot reap “an unearned harvest at the expense of the players.”70 
The “laws against lotteries are designed to prevent improverishment [sic] 
of the unwary, to discourage the gambling spirit and prevent the public 
from wagering their substance upon chance and the fortuitous events so 
that one cannot be enticed to hazard his earnings on a chance to win a 
prize.”71 Moreover, the laws protect the unwary and prevent the exploita-
tion of the “natural yearning in most everyone to get something for noth-
ing.”72 “[T]he people of this state . . . recognized that the gambling in-
                                                 
 62. State ex rel. Schillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 450 P.2d 949, 952–53 (Wash. 1969) (hold-
ing that a grocery store’s promotion contest was a lottery). 
 63. Id. at 953. 
 64. Id. at 952–53. 
 65. State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d 787, 794 (Wash. 1952) (“We cannot agree 
with appellant’s contention that Art. II, § 24 . . . applies only to chartered or ticket lotteries. In the 
first place, we feel most strongly that the language of this constitutional provision is not ambiguous. 
The provision is phrased in the broadest and most sweeping terms. It prohibits any lot-
tery.”) (emphasis in original). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 796. 
 68. E.g., Ex parte Ted’s Game Enters., 893 So. 2d 376, 377 (Ala. 2004) (“‘[A]ll private lotter-
ies by tickets, cards, or dice . . . are prohibited under a penalty . . . for him that shall erect such lotter-
ies.’” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 173)). 
 69. D’Orio v. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565 (Wash. 1929) (finding that a contest involving solving a 
checker problem was a game of skill). 
 70. Id. 
 71. State ex rel. Schillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 450 P.2d 949, 956 (Wash. 1969). 
 72. Id. 
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stinct is strong in human nature and enacted these provisions to protect 
themselves from their own inclination to engage in self-deception when 
that instinct is stirred.”73 The constitutional ban is, to a significant de-
gree, Washington’s first foray into the realm of consumer protection. 
It is no surprise then that unauthorized lotteries may violate current 
consumer protection laws. The Washington Consumer Protection Act 
(CPA) prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of 
any trade or commerce.”74 For a plaintiff to prevail under the CPA, a pri-
vate party must prove the following: (1) the defendant’s act or practice is 
unfair or deceptive; (2) the act or practice occurred in trade or commerce; 
(3) the act or practice affects the public interest; (4) the act or practice 
caused injury to business or property; and (5) a causal link.75 In at least 
one instance, the Washington Supreme Court has found a lottery in viola-
tion of the CPA.76 In Reader’s Digest, the court determined that a maga-
zine sweepstakes was a lottery.77 The court further held that a lottery was 
“[p]er se an unfair trade practice” and a violation of the CPA.78 
More broadly, unauthorized lotteries also violate federal law. Fed-
eral courts applying the Federal Trade Commission Act,79 upon which 
the CPA is based, consistently hold that an unauthorized “lottery” in 
states prohibiting lotteries is an unfair trade practice.80 The lottery is an 
unfair method of competition precisely because it is contrary to public 
policy and punishable under criminal statutes in many states.81 But, as 
the next Part explores, not all methods of competition and gaming are 
unfair. Lotteries have their own characteristics that make them so widely 
despised. 
                                                 
 73. Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch, 495 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Wash. 1972). 
 74. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020. 
 75. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 
1986) (clarifying a “highly confused area of the law”). 
 76. State v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 501 P.2d 290, 299 (Wash. 1972), modified by Hang-
man Ridge, 719 P.2d at 535 (holding that the ability to declare a practice a “per se” violation of the 
CPA rested with the legislature, not the courts). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. As noted above, Washington courts no longer have the ability to declare a practice a per 
se violation of the CPA. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 535. 
 79. 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 80. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. R. F. Keppell & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); Peerless Prod., Inc. 
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 284 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961); Globe 
Cardboard Novelty Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 192 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1951); Wolf v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 135 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1943); Helen Ardelle, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 101 F.2d 718 
(9th Cir. 1939); Ostler Candy Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 106 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1939), cert. de-
nied, 309 U.S. 675 (1940). 
 81. Keppell, 291 U.S. at 313–14. 
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IV. ELEMENTS OF LOTTERIES: PRIZE, CONSIDERATION, CHANCE 
A lottery is a “scheme for the distribution of money or property by 
chance, among persons who have paid or agreed to pay a valuable con-
sideration for the chance.”82 The elements of this definition are well-
established: prize, consideration, and chance.83 While the first two ele-
ments—prize and consideration—present little controversy in application 
to penny auctions, the final element of chance is less easily defined and 
consequently more difficult to apply. 
A. Prize 
Though no statutory definition of “prize” exists, the language of the 
statute describes the thing to be distributed as “money or property.”84 
Moreover, a “[t]hing of value . . . means any money or property, any to-
ken, object or article exchangeable for money or property, or any form of 
credit or promise, . . . or in involving extension of a service, entertain-
ment, or a privilege of playing at a game or scheme without charge.”85 
While the courts consistently describe this element as a “prize,” this ter-
minology appears to be a judicial gloss on the statutory language of 
“money or property,” not an independent term in need of explanation.86 
Under Washington law, the prize element in a penny auction web-
site is quickly demonstrated. Although one could argue there is no prize 
at the end of the penny auction because the “winner” still has to pay for 
the item like a traditional auction, the argument fails even cursory exam-
ination. Even if the auction item cannot be a “prize” because it is paid 
for, the discount alone is sufficient to constitute a prize. The merchandise 
offered in a penny auction at the final bid price, which is typically a dis-
count from the retail price, is sufficient to constitute a prize as the mer-
chandise is property of some value. In some penny auctions, the value of 
the property is quite high relative to the final bid. Given that items like “a 
sack of flour or a can of a certain brand of fish” constitute a prize,87 it 
follows that an expensive electronic device for 90% below retail price 
would qualify as well. 
                                                 
 82. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0257. 
 83. Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch, 495 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Wash. 1972); State ex rel. Schillberg v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 450 P.2d 949, 953 (Wash. 1969); State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 247 
P.2d 787, 797 (Wash. 1952); State v. Danz, 250 P. 37, 38 (Wash. 1926); Soc’y Theatre v. Seattle, 
203 P. 21, 22 (Wash. 1922). 
 84. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0257. 
 85. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0285. 
 86. See Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 409 P.2d 160, 162 (Wash. 1965); Danz, 
250 P. at 37–38. 
 87. Soc’y Theater, 203 P. at 21. 
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B. Consideration 
Consideration encompasses “acts of forbearances, promises, or 
conduct which in law are sufficient to support an agreement.”88 So long 
as a court could find “consideration, in whatever form, actually mov[ing] 
from the participants to the promoters” the element is satisfied.89 Suffi-
cient consideration is present if a person does something the person 
would otherwise not do—a detriment.90 The use of the participant’s time, 
thought, attention, or energy may also constitute sufficient detriment.91 
The participant’s opinion that he has given nothing of value is not “de-
terminative.”92 
Like the prize, the existence of consideration is readily apparent. 
First, the bidders pay for each individual bid. Second, in almost every 
auction, a bidder will use multiple bids, sometimes dozens or hundreds 
of bids, in an effort to prevail. Thus, the bidders can incur substantial 
costs during the auction regardless of the outcome. Finally, each bidder 
allocates the bidder’s time, thought, attention, and energy to search for 
and bid in the auctions. Even independently, any of these reasons are 
likely sufficient detriment to the bidder and constitute action the bidder 
might otherwise not do.93 
The most serious challenge to this element arises from the so-called 
“Buy Now” features of some penny auction websites.94 Under this fea-
ture, a losing bidder may apply the bid fees to buy the item at a posted 
price. Penny auction websites and their defenders claim that this ability 
means you do not lose the money spent on bid fees.95 Even if this argu-
ment is correct, the fact remains that a court may find consideration in 
                                                 
 88. Schillberg, 450 P.2d at 955. 
 89. Id. at 954. “Consideration for a lottery may be both gain and detriment or one without the 
other.” Id. at 955. 
 90. Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch, 495 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Wash. 1972). 
 91. Schillberg, 450 P.2d at 956–57. 
 92. Seattle Times, 495 P.2d at 1369. 
 93. See id. at 1371–72. 
 94. QuiBids 101—Buy Now Explained, QUIBIDS, http://www.quibids.com/quibids101/blog/25-
Buy-Now-Explained (last visited Apr. 2, 2012). But not all online penny auctions offer this feature. 
E.g., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), SKOREIT!, https://www.skoreit.com/Help/FAQ (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2012) (“At SkoreIt!, every bid you place takes you one step closer to winning the item at an 
incredible discount and is, in effect, an investment into that auction. With that being said, once you 
place a bid into an auction, it becomes part of the auction and is non-refundable.”). 
 95. QuiBids 101—How It’s Not Gambling, QUIBIDS, http://www.quibids.com/ 
quibids101/blog/39-How-Its-Not-Gambling (last visited Aug. 14, 2012); Are Penny Auctions Gam-
bling?, PENNYBURNERS, http://www.pennyburners.com/getting-started/are-penny-auctions-
gambling (last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (arguing non-exclusively that penny auctions are not gambling 
because bidders “must pay for the item being auctioned,” per-bid fees are merely “entrance fees,” 
and a “buy it now” feature nullifies any argument because the fees are not worthless upon losing). 
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“whatever form.”96 Consequently, the bidder’s time and energy spent 
bidding in the auction—doing something the bidder would otherwise not 
do—is sufficient consideration.97 
C. Chance 
Even if a court can easily establish two of the three elements, the 
outcome ultimately rests on whether the distribution of the merchandise 
from a penny auction occurs by chance. Appropriately, chance is the dis-
positive element because it “is the lure that draws the credulous and un-
suspecting into the deceptive scheme, and it is what the law denounces as 
wrong and demoralizing.”98 That is, it is the existence of chance—the 
unknown outcome—that provides the thrill and fun of “entertainment 
auctions.” 
Chance, it turns out, is the most difficult area of lottery law.99 The 
Washington legislature did not create a statutory definition of chance.100 
Nor have the courts developed a concise definition. Instead, what we are 
left with is a matter of judicial inquiry on a case-by-case basis: “The 
court will inquire, not into the name, but into the game, however, skill-
fully disguised, in order to ascertain if it is prohibited, or if it has the el-
ement of chance.”101 
Because undefined statutory terms are given their ordinary mean-
ing, including the meaning found in a dictionary,102 courts have devel-
oped a variety of definitions for chance. But it is generally understood to 
be “used in the sense of being opposed to something which happens by 
plan or design, or by the exercise of volition or judgment.”103 In the 
words of Justice Holmes, “What a man does not know and cannot find 
out is chance to him, and is recognized as chance by the law.”104 Conse-
quently, a lack of information is a form of chance.105 
                                                 
 96. Schillberg, 450 P.2d at 954. 
 97. Id. at 956–57; Seattle Times, 495 P.2d at 1369. 
 98. Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 409 P.2d 160, 163–64 (Wash. 1965) (quoting 
State v. Lipkin, 84 S.E. 340, 343 (N.C. 1915)). 
 99. Charles Pickett, Contests and the Lottery Laws, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1196, 1210 (1932) (“The 
requirement of chance presents perhaps the most perplexing aspect of lottery law.”). 
 100. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0257. 
 101. Sherwood, 409 P.2d at 163–64 (quoting Lipkin, 84 S.E. at 343 (“It is the one playing at 
the game who is influenced by the hope enticingly held out, which is often false or disappointing, 
that he will, perhaps and by good luck, get something for nothing, or a great deal for a very little 
outlay.”)). 
 102. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 243 P.3d 1283, 1289 (Wash. 2010). 
 103. 54 C.J.S. Lotteries § 2b (2012). 
 104. Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U.S. 370, 373 (1924). 
 105. See id. 
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In penny auctions then, the question is whether a person, in the 
form of a semi-anonymous online bidder, satisfies the element of chance 
because the bidder is the unknown in the auction; the bidder decides 
when to bid and when not to bid. Although public officials should scruti-
nize penny auctions because of increasing consumer complaints, remark-
ably little case law on penny auctions exists, and none render a decision 
applicable to this Comment.106 
This section will first explain the role chance must play under the 
qualitatively dominant rule, which is the starting point for the case-by-
case inquiry required by Washington law. Then it will address four ques-
tions about chance and apply these questions to penny auctions to deter-
mine if chance exists. The four questions are (1) whether the participants 
control the outcome; (2) whether skill plays a role in penny auctions; (3) 
whether humans can be a source of chance; and (4) whether the asym-
metric information environment creates chance. 
1. The Qualitatively Dominant Rule 
In defining a lottery, the chance element can be met by something 
less than “pure chance.”107 An element of skill, judgment, or knowledge 
may accompany chance to some degree so long as chance is the domi-
nant factor in determining the result.108 “It may be said that an event pre-
sents the element of chance so far as after the exercise of research, inves-
tigation, skill, and judgment we are unable to foresee its occurrence or 
non-occurrence or the forms and conditions of its occurrence.”109 
The dominance of the chance is measured by a qualitative test.110 
The most helpful statutory language defines a “[c]ontest of chance” as 
“any contest, game, gaming scheme, or gaming device in which the out-
come depends in a material degree upon an element of chance, notwith-
standing that skill of the contestants may also be a factor therein.”111 
Chance must be an integral part of the contest that influenced the result, 
but it does not have to be a quantitatively greater portion when viewing 
                                                 
 106. The lack of case law may soon change. Consumer complaints against penny auctions are 
on the rise as their popularity grows. At least one once popular penny auction, BidRack, shut down 
and faces a consumer class action lawsuit in California federal court. The court denied a motion to 
dismiss on six of the seven substantive claims of the class in September 2011. Parino v. BidRack, 
Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 900 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 107. Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch, 495 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Wash. 1972). 
 108. Id.; Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 409 P.2d 160, 162–63 (Wash. 1965). 
 109. People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 179 N.Y. 164, 169 (1904). 
 110. Seattle Times, 495 P.2d at 1369–70. 
 111. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0225. 
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the scheme as a whole.112 Chance must be the dominant factor in a 
“causative sense.”113 
The application of the qualitatively dominant rule is simpler when 
the scheme or plan involves a mechanical device that can be deconstruct-
ed and easily understood. In Evans, a non-profit fraternal organization 
operated slot machines for use by members at its facility.114 The court 
held that a slot machine is a lottery regardless of the regular order of 
prize distribution or the player’s knowledge of the machine’s opera-
tion.115 Because the court found that the slot machine required no skill, it 
determined that the mechanical device in control of the spinning drums 
was the dominant factor in the distribution.116 While a player could, with 
adequate time and money, play the slot machine enough to receive 95% 
of the player’s money back, “the practical facts of life [are] . . . that sel-
dom, if ever, is it to be expected that the machines would be operated by 
players in the precise fashion just described.”117 Whether a particular op-
eration constitutes a lottery depends on the scheme or plan involved, ra-
ther than the mechanical device employed.118 
Unfortunately, for all the beautiful judicial language it inspires, the 
qualitatively dominant rule provides remarkably little guidance. There is 
no exclusive list of factors to consider or bright line test to determine the 
“quality” of dominance. This lack of guidance is the natural consequence 
of this “most perplexing”119 part of lottery law because the law requires, 
in every sense of the word, a case-by-case examination. 
2. Do the Participants Control the Outcome? 
Chance exists when the participants have no control over the factors 
that determine whether they receive any prize.120 In Sherwood, a seller 
utilized a referral-selling scheme, in which a purchaser pays for equip-
ment and, in exchange, the purchaser will receive commissions on future 
sales to new customers referred by the purchaser.121 The court held that 
                                                 
 112. Sherwood, 409 P.2d at 163. 
 113. Seattle Times, 495 P.2d at 1370, (quoting State ex lnf. McKittrick v. Globe-Demorat Pub. 
Co., 110 S.W.2d 705, 717 (Mo. 1937)). 
 114. State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d 787, 789–90 (Wash. 1952). 
 115. Id. at 797. 
 116. Id. at 796–97. 
 117. Id. at 798. 
 118. See id. at 798. 
 119. Pickett, supra note 99, at 1210. 
 120. Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 409 P.2d 160, 162 (Wash. 1965). 
 121. Id. at 161. 
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the referral-selling scheme was a lottery.122 Even assuming that the pur-
chaser used skill or judgment in selecting referrals, chance pervaded the 
arrangement when the referrals may not be interested, the sales presenta-
tion may be inadequate, the referrals might already have been referred, 
the market may be saturated with the equipment, and the salesperson 
may never contact the referral.123 The number of unknowns inherent in 
the scheme creates the chance. 
Just as the referral-scheme was a lottery because the purchasers had 
“no control,” a penny auction is a lottery because bidders cannot control 
the arrival of new bidders.124 Until the penny auction concludes, the po-
tential entry of bidders eliminates the control any individual player has 
over the outcome of the auction. The bidder’s control over his or her in-
dividual bid, like the purchaser’s control over the selection of referrals, is 
irrelevant to the outcome of the penny auction.125 The determinative fac-
tor of the auction is the occurrence of future bids. 
Unlike Sherwood, where whether the purchasers received a com-
mission depended entirely on if the seller made additional sales,126 a pen-
ny auction website has no role in determining the result—the bidders 
determine it. A referral-selling scheme is a lottery because the purchasers 
ceded control to the seller after making the referral and had no opportuni-
ty to influence the results.127 Though an individual bidder cannot control 
the actions of other bidders, a bidder retains the ability to bid again. As a 
result, the bidder always has the opportunity to reclaim control. 
The bidder’s control is illusory, however. Until the auction con-
cludes, the potential entry of bidders eliminates the control any individu-
al player has over the outcome of the auction. Theoretically, a penny auc-
tion never has to end. Because each bid adds time onto the auction, the 
clock will never expire so long as new bids occur. In reality, there is 
some point (or at least there should be some point) at which no new bids 
will occur because the bid will no longer yield any conceivable savings. 
But a bidder has no way to calculate that end point for other bidders short 
of the retail price of the item. 
                                                 
 122. Id. at 164 (“Respondents took a chance on whether they could get something for nothing. 
This chance permeates the entire scheme of referral selling. This court holds that the referral selling 
scheme is a lottery.”). 
 123. Id. at 162–64. 
 124. Id. at 162. 
 125. See id. 
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3. What Role Does Skill Play in the Outcome? 
The relevance of skill in determining the outcome is also critical to 
the chance inquiry. If a game can “certainly be won by a skillful player it 
is not a game of chance.”128 In D’Orio, the court held that a game in 
which a player secured a checker problem by a punching board and ob-
tained a prize if he solved the problem was a “game of skill” and not a 
lottery.129 As the parties stipulated that any checker game could be won if 
the person “ha[d] sufficient skill as a checker player,” the court reasoned 
that chance did not dominate the game if skill could be decisive.130 “The 
fact that one player may be less skillful than another or that one of the 
games may be more difficult than another does not make it a game of 
chance.”131 
A contest is a lottery even if a lack of knowledge or skill eliminates 
many contestants.132 For example, this rule is illustrated in the Washing-
ton Supreme Court’s examination of a newspaper’s weekly (and popular) 
football forecasting contest. 133 In that case, the Seattle Times filed an 
action for declaratory judgment regarding whether its football-
forecasting contest was an illegal lottery. 134 In the forecasting contest, 
contestants attempted to pick the winners of football games.135 The court 
held that the football-forecasting contest was prohibited as a lottery.136 
Although a lack of skill, expertise, knowledge, and judgment regarding 
football prevented some contestants from winning, the contest did not 
require these attributes to enter.137 The attributes merely defined the truly 
competitive contestants, who were then separated only by chance.138 
To the extent that any skill or judgment exists in a penny auction, it 
does not decide the outcome; it merely eliminates the unskilled contest-
ants.139 By adopting the “power bidder” strategy, a bidder may discour-
age others from competing, assuming other bidders are aware of the 
power bidder’s reputation.140 However, the use of this strategy merely 
culls the bidders with an inferior strategy or insufficient funds. Once 
                                                 
 128. D’Orio v. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 566 (Wash. 1929). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 564. 
 131. Id. at 566. 
 132. Seattle Times v. Tielsch, 495 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Wash. 1972). 
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 134. Id. 
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 136. Id. at 1370. 
 137. Id. at 1373. 
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 139. See id. 
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ing text. 
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weaker bidders drop out, the outcome between two equally strong, equal-
ly determined, and equally well-funded bidders is relegated to chance.141 
A bidder can never ensure that he or she will ultimately win an auction 
by continuing to place bids because there may be other determined bid-
ders fighting to ensure that they will win. The skill or strategy may in-
crease the odds in the bidder’s favor, but they cannot determine the out-
come regardless of the amount of skill or type of strategy employed.142 
With each bid, the bidder spends the bid fee on the chance that no 
later bids will be placed. If the bidder is outbid, a new contest begins and 
the clock is reset. Though one may bid again, it is a new bid on the out-
come of a future contingent event. As a bidder cannot know whether an-
other bidder will bid, the chance element is satisfied. 
Penny auction proponents critique this per-bid separation of a pen-
ny auction. They argue that the per-bid breakdown—creating a series of 
discrete lotteries occurring tens, hundreds, or even thousands of times per 
penny auction—is not an accurate depiction of the penny auction. As a 
result, this separation is an unconvincing attempt to redefine the penny 
auction to eliminate the role of judgment and strategy, specifically the 
development of an auction reputation. The purpose of the prohibitions on 
lotteries, on the other hand, is not to “forbid games of skill or . . . bar the 
ordinary chance or contingency which is involved in practically every 
human endeavor.”143 Under this disaggregation argument, nearly any 
game of skill could be sufficiently sliced into component parts to be a 
matter of chance. 
Yet, it is the overall plan or scheme, not the “device,” that introduc-
es chance.144 A penny auction acts like an online slot machine where the 
bidders, with each click, feed the bid fee into a virtual slot for the chance 
to win a jackpot. No one can predict who will win, and no matter how 
many times a player bids, their likelihood of winning does not in-
crease.145 Their likelihood cannot increase because the chance remains a 
function of whether the next bid occurs—an occurrence wholly outside 
of the bidder’s action. The strategies hold out the false hope that this time 
will be different; that this time there is no one else; that this time the 
counter will reach zero. 
The various bidding strategies, while superficially logical, employ 
the same reasoning expressly rejected in Evans;146 by simply bidding 
                                                 
 141. See Seattle Times v. Tielsch, 495 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Wash. 1972). 
 142. See id. 
 143. D’Orio v. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565 (Wash. 1929). 
 144. State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friend, 247 P.2d 787, 798 (Wash. 1952). 
 145. See id. 
 146. Id. at 797. 
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often enough and long enough, the bidder can eventually win. A bidder is 
no more likely to prevail on the first bid than on the one hundredth bid 
because, even with a perfect strategy, a new bidder may always enter 
before the end of the auction. But the poor odds, which are part of any 
lottery scheme, are deceptive. The lure of lotteries is the result of a com-
bination of myopic decision-making147 with the seemingly low stakes of 
buying a ticket.148 As one researcher put it, “It almost doesn’t feel real. 
The lottery and penny slots are kind of the sweet spot of risk taking. 
They’re really cheap, really inexpensive to play, but there’s a big possi-
ble upside.”149 This allure is present not just in penny auctions, but in the 
strategies themselves. 
Thus, the absence of bidder control and the generally limited role of 
skill and strategy suggest that chance plays the qualitatively dominant 
role in the outcome of a penny auction. But this conclusion begs the 
question: If the other bidders’ decisions control the outcome, are those 
decisions themselves the result of chance? 
4. Can Humans Be an Element of Chance? 
One might define chance as not only outside a plan or design, but 
entirely random and not within the control of any individual or group of 
                                                 
 147. Game and business management theories explain myopia as the immediate focus of expe-
dient decisions. STEPHEN J. HOCH & RICHARD C. KUNREUTHER, WHARTON ON MAKING DECISIONS 
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human decision makers.150 Under this narrow human-free definition, 
chance cannot be the dominant factor in the outcome of a penny auction 
because a human makes each (at least theoretically) bidding decision.151 
At least one court ascribed to the theory that an activity is not sub-
ject to chance if the outcome is entirely determined by the decisions and 
actions of the participants.152 In Lindsay, a collection of merchants used a 
popularity contest as a marketing tool.153 In the contest, based on the pur-
chase of qualifying goods, merchants gave consumers tickets on which 
the consumers could “vote” for any person.154 The persons receiving the 
highest number of votes received one out of a number of prizes.155 The 
court held that the contest was not a lottery because the outcome was 
determined by the participants.156 The act of voting had “no resemblance 
to the blind fate which is determined by the drawing of a number, the 
turning of a card, or the spinning of a wheel.”157 
Applying the popularity contest case law to penny auctions, be-
cause a person makes each decision to bid and a person is a rational ac-
tor, there is insufficient chance for a penny auction to be a lottery. As the 
bidders control the outcome as a group, a penny auction, like a popularity 
contest, is not subject to chance and cannot be a lottery.158 Each bid is a 
culmination of a series of decisions by the bidder regarding the bidder’s 
desire for the item, the bidder’s maximum bid price, and the bidder’s 
willingness to use his or her remaining bids. Thus, the outcome of each 
penny auction is the result of the decisions of the participants.159 
Moreover, the decision to bid is unlike putting a coin into a slot 
machine because a pre-set, automated mechanism beyond the control of 
all participants decides whether a person wins when playing a slot ma-
chine.160 An automated mechanism does not determine the outcome of 
each penny auction or the final price for the item.161 The bid fee no more 
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determines the outcome of the penny auction than the quarter determines 
the slot machine. The rolling drum determines the outcome in a slot ma-
chine; the bidders as a group determine the outcome in a penny auction. 
This “human factor” argument, while facially plausible and con-
vincing, rests on a shaky foundation. First, the argument relies on an 
overly broad characterization of the “popularity contest” case law.162 
Namely, that the popularity contest holdings stand for the idea that if par-
ticipants solely control the outcome of the contest, there is no chance.163 
The actual holdings are narrower: “voting,” as the conscious and willful 
act of a human being, cannot be chance.164 The courts decide these cases 
not based on who decided the outcome, but how the participants decided 
the outcome.165 
There is a significant factual distinction between a vote in an elec-
tion and a bid in a penny auction; the ability to vote entitled the holder to 
nothing.166 Even the use of that vote provided no benefit to the person.167 
Likewise, merely possessing the ability to bid in an online penny auction 
entitles the bidder to nothing. Once placed, however, the bid entitles the 
bidder to the auction item, at least until a new bid is placed. It is precise-
ly this point that the “popularity contest” cases turn on.168 “By the ar-
rangement, each purchaser of goods of certain value obtained a ticket, 
which simply entitled him to the right to vote in the contest, but by no 
possibility could he obtain a piano merely as a holder of such ticket, or of 
any number of tickets, on account of these purchases.”169 These populari-
ty contests were not considered lotteries because there was “no appeal to 
the cupidity of any one, nor inducement to make reckless purchases in 
the hope of securing some prize superior in value to the amount invest-
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ed.”170 The vote was an ancillary benefit, not the purpose of the expendi-
ture. 
A penny auction is further distinguished because the participants in 
the popularity contest received the ability to vote from the purchase of an 
item.171 The popularity contest cases involved promotional schemes in-
tended to increase sales, rather than business unto itself.172 Voters pur-
chased an item, which incidentally gave them the right to vote.173 The 
bidder in a penny auction gets no value for the money and time expended 
to bid, unlike the popularity contest voter, who at least received the valu-
able merchandise.174 Every voter got something he or she wanted;175 the 
losing bidders in a penny auction get nothing, except the chance to spend 
more money. 
More importantly, other case law presents a more nuanced under-
standing of the limitations of the human factor argument.176 In Hecht, 
customers joined a “suit club” for $2 per week, and the management or 
solicitor chose one member to receive a suit each week.177 The court 
found that the “plan of doing business was to select some person to re-
ceive a suit of clothes and waive all further payments.”178 As such, the 
court held that the suit club was a lottery because the customer gets “the 
chance of securing the suit before he pays for it.”179 The court reasoned 
that “it may be said that there is no element of chance because there is no 
drawing; that the management itself selects the beneficiary; but this fact 
does not purge the transaction of all element of chance. To the purchaser 
it is uncertain, as to him it is chance.”180 Here, the court identified a spe-
cific person who created the chance, defying the notion that a human 
cannot, by definition, be a source of chance. Finally, the human factor 
argument necessarily implies a broader policy consideration regarding 
the validity of the voting process.181 Broader challenges to voting may 
have followed judicial decisions that a vote, in any context, was a lot-
tery.182 Although no court explicitly mentions this concern, a zealous 
advocate could make a good faith argument for the extension of the law 
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from a popularity contest to challenge actual government elections. Once 
chance exists in the vote, there are plausible arguments that the office 
sought is a prize, and the campaign funds expended are consideration. 
Regardless, insufficient information may taint the decision-making 
process such that the rationality is fundamentally and incurably flawed. 
Where there is always incomplete information, there is always chance. 
But it may only matter that the perception of insufficient information 
comes from the voter; the objective actions of the prize giver are irrele-
vant. 
5. Does the Asymmetric Information Environment Create Chance? 
Whatever the merits of the arguments that chance exists because of 
the absence of control, the minimal effect of skill and strategy, and the 
influence of human participation, the lack of information is the strongest 
reason why chance controls the outcome of a penny auction. The other 
bidders—semi-anonymous online users about whom the bidder may have 
little or no information—lay a foundation that produces a result outside a 
“plan or design.”183 Since the bidder “does not know and cannot find 
out” a competing bidder’s actions, the competition’s action “is chance as 
to [the bidder] and is recognized as chance by the law.”184 The imperfect 
information introduces the element of chance. 
Imperfect information is an inherent part of the online environ-
ment.185 “A contest involves perfect information if the game is sequential 
and each player knows every action of the players that moved before him 
at every point.”186 Devices linked in disparate locations like in online 
penny auctions give rise to an uncertainty about the identity, motivation, 
and reputation of opponents.187 The bidders’ remoteness creates a signifi-
cant information gap fatal to the rationality of the decision to start or 
continue bidding in a particular auction. Subsequent bids without this 
information are, therefore, random from the individual bidder’s perspec-
tive because the bidder does not know, cannot discern, and is unable to 
predict the decision-making process of others. Thus, chance is the quali-
tatively dominant factor in determining the result of the penny auctions. 
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In fact, the bidder cannot know for certain that the other bidder is a 
person at all.188 Some penny auction websites utilize computer programs, 
commonly referred to as “shill bidders,” “bidbots,” or “bots,” to act as 
bidders in order to increase the bid price and keep the auction going.189 
This practice also simulates increased traffic to the website that is helpful 
in search engine results and in building a reputation.190 Nor is the use of 
“bots” restricted to the penny auction websites themselves.191 Other bid-
ders may purchase “bots” to run on personal computers set by the bidder 
to bid in lieu of the person sitting at his or her computer.192 It is this in-
formation void that introduces chance.193 
In fact, this asymmetric information is part of the draw of penny 
auctions. The industry’s self-characterization of the online penny auction 
as “entertainment shopping” turns that asymmetry into a positive.194 A 
penny auction, under this description, offers bidders not only the poten-
tial fantastic deal but also the added benefit of an enjoyable, even thrill-
ing, shopping experience.195 It is the thrill that puts the entertainment in 
entertainment shopping.196 
Penny auctions fulfill all the necessary elements of a lottery’s statu-
tory definition. Penny auctions involve a prize, in the form of the prize 
and the discount to the winner. They involve consideration as the bidder 
spends time, money, and energy the bidder otherwise would not expend. 
And, as this Comment has shown, the always-present information 
asymmetry creates chance. Whether this means they should be prohibited 
altogether deserves further scrutiny and is the subject of the next Part of 
this Comment. 
V. SOLUTION—FINDING THE THIRD WAY 
A. The Policy Against Pestilence 
From a public policy perspective, penny auctions rely on the addic-
tiveness of gambling to appeal to the human tendency to risk a small sum 
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for the chance to win a prize of greater value.197 This pervasive tendency 
to want “something for nothing” motivated the bans on lotteries in the 
first place: 
Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are 
comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-
spread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few per-
sons and places, but the latter infests the whole community; it enters 
every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earn-
ings of the poor; and it plunders the ignorant and simple.198 
The drafters designed the Washington constitution and Washington Re-
vised Code § 9.46.0257 to curtail this “natural yearning.”199 
But, the narrow definition of chance discussed above is not sup-
ported by the policy rationales for lottery prohibitions and conflicts with 
the critical inquiry consistently required by Washington courts.200 Super-
ficial inquiries seem inadequate when “the vice of the whole scheme lies 
farther back than that, and is found in the ‘chance’ which the customer 
takes when he pays his money . . . and the temptation held out to arouse 
the gambling spirit” that will lead to losing all that one has paid “if he 
fails once or twice, or more time to win the prize, and discontinues pay-
ing.”201 Chance exists when the scheme appeals to the “disposition for 
engaging in hazards and chances with the hope that luck and good for-
tune may give a great return for a small outlay, and is we think the gen-
eral meaning of the word lottery, and clearly within the mischief against 
which the statute is aimed.”202 Chance is an element of a lottery because 
it is the unknown that provides the thrill. Any scheme that preys on this 
natural human tendency should receive critical review. 
At this point the entertainment shopping industry may be a victim 
of its own success. Penny auctions may be exciting, but the law frequent-
ly regulates activities that may be entertaining for other policy reasons. If 
courts accept penny auctions’ self-serving industry description as enter-
tainment shopping by consenting adults, then that definition could easily 
be expanded to other prohibited or regulated industries and activities. 
Betting on sports could be seen as “entertainment viewing,” speeding as 
“entertainment driving,” and vandalism as “entertainment artistry.” Per-
mitting an industry to rebrand itself to avoid the consequences of poten-
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tially illegal and unconstitutional activity proves patently absurd on its 
face. 
The penny auction preys on the human desire to get “something for 
nothing” and “is essentially gambling.”203 Government authorities con-
sistently seek to control lotteries because lotteries insidiously drain socie-
ty and prevent the development of the public’s necessary skills.204 While 
the drafters of the Washington State Constitution were certainly not mo-
tivated by the same concerns as the rulers of medieval England,205 the 
pervasive and corroding nature of lotteries was certainly on their mind.206 
It would be a perverse outcome for the penny auction to survive because 
of the thrill, when the thrill is what the ban on lotteries ultimately 
fights.207 
B. The Options 
Because penny auctions likely are lotteries as defined in Washing-
ton, the state could adopt a variety of responses: (1) continue the current 
regulation, address consumer complaints individually, and stress con-
sumer education; (2) undertake enforcement actions based on the Wash-
ington constitution and the WCPA in order to eliminate online penny 
auction operations within the state; or (3) enforce the Washington consti-
tution, but encourage the Washington State Legislature to pass a bill to 
authorize online penny auctions as part of the state-run lottery. 
Given the rising number of consumer complaints and perceived 
lawlessness in the industry,208 the Washington legislature should not con-
tinue along the current path. The once-vaunted doctrine of caveat emptor 
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gave way to government-led consumer protection long ago.209 Some reg-
ulation is necessary, even if the political realities and emerging organiza-
tion of the entertainment auction industry may present hurdles.210 
Applying the Washington constitutional ban on lotteries to online 
penny auctions and encouraging other states (all of which have similar 
bans by statute or constitution) to follow, is appealing for its simplicity. 
Realistically, a market for this type of business has already been estab-
lished and cultivated—first in Europe and now in the United States. Pre-
tending that a state ban in Washington will have any meaningful effect 
on the number of Washington residents using online penny auctions ig-
nores reality. The interstate and international nature of the Internet makes 
any meaningful enforcement expensive and sporadic. The government’s 
experience with the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act211 
over the past six years demonstrates the difficulty of drafting and enforc-
ing a ban.212 State prohibitions can ultimately ensure only that all penny 
auction websites will be hosted overseas and outside of American juris-
diction, increasing the likelihood of exploitative practices by unregulated 
penny auctioneers. 
There is a final path—let the already existing Washington state lot-
tery add a new game: the Penny Auction. With this solution, the state 
will enforce the Washington constitution while developing a state-run 
online penny auction overseen by the Washington Lottery Commis-
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sion.213 The Commission already has the power to modify the state lot-
tery.214 In fact, new “games” are vital to the continued operation of a lot-
tery because they increase revenue,215 and many lotteries now cross state 
lines.216 The movement of a lottery into the online environment is a logi-
cal next step. It is the next step leveraging the useful aspects of regulated 
lotteries to augment state revenues—a once novel idea that is now rela-
tively uncontroversial.217 In many ways, the state-run lottery is merely a 
return to the practices of early America.218 
Unfortunately, the current Washington statute bans the sale of lot-
tery tickets over the Internet.219 But a 2011 opinion from the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) opened the door to overturn that ban.220 In this opinion, 
the DOJ reversed its position that the Wire Act of 1969221 prohibited 
online sales of lottery tickets.222 Following this opinion, Illinois became 
the first state to legalize the sale of lottery tickets online.223 The best reg-
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ulatory response to the rise of penny auctions for consumer protection 
agencies is not to bury their heads in the sand; it is to find a statutory ac-
commodation combining the power to create new lottery games and the 
recent liberalization of online lottery ticket sales. 
A state-run penny auction is in keeping with modern regulation of 
vices more generally. The outright ban of a “vice,” especially a popular 
one, is nearly always ineffective, and usually expensively ineffective.224 
Much more effective are the present policies toward gaming225 and to-
bacco.226 These policies curb and regulate the availability and use, with-
out attempting to foist restrictions that few citizens actually desire. 
In an era of state budget deficits and funding shortages for virtually 
every service including education, the use of a new game on a new plat-
form may provide some relief. If we are to allow this highly successful 
lottery to continue, it should be with proper oversight. The Washington 
State Lottery Commission already exists to do precisely this—it uses the 
“pestilence” of lotteries to the advantage of the state.227 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Penny auctions are big business and only appear to be growing in 
revenue and popularity. A court’s determination that the auction partici-
pants, as anonymous online auction bidders, create sufficient chance be-
cause of the imperfect information in the online environment is a matter 
of first impression in Washington. This state has frequently led the way 
in these types of emerging business issues. In fact, the Consumer Protec-
tion Division of the Washington State Attorney General’s Office is one 
of the few government agencies to take any interest in penny auctions.228 
Yet, the state’s action to date is insufficient. 
The effort to bring this burgeoning industry to heel will not be easy. 
It represents a new challenge to the consumer protection regulations in 
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place, especially those concerning lotteries and gambling. Additionally, 
there is persuasive authority from other jurisdictions that indicates 
chance cannot exist when a group of people controls the outcome. But, 
because the bidder’s likelihood of winning does not increase by placing 
additional bids, the bidder has no control over the bidding strategy of 
other bidders. Thus, the bidder lacks significant information about the 
other bidders, and the bidders do not determine the outcome of an auc-
tion. The subsequent bid is random from the individual bidder’s perspec-
tive, which is the perspective that matters. The lack of control over in-
formation demonstrates that chance, not skill, is the qualitatively domi-
nant factor in a scheme that distributes a prize—a lottery. 
The judicial mandate in Washington lottery law is searching and 
skeptical; the court must verify that the scheme is not a new formulation 
of the “wide-spread pestilence of lotteries.”229 
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